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Abstract 
 The democratic Constitutional dispensation has led to the gradual 
extension of spousal duties of support to unmarried couples who 
hitherto could not legally claim support from their partners or from third 
parties who had unlawfully caused the death of their partners. The new 
recipients of rights to support can be divided into three groups: wives 
in Muslim religious marriages, partners in same-sex intimate 
relationships and unmarried opposite sex cohabitants whose 
relationships closely resemble civil marriage in both form and function. 
However, certain distinctive features of customary marriage, the 
continuing consequences of apartheid policies for African families and 
certain distinctive patrilineal features of traditional African families have 
largely excluded African women – who constitute the largest and most 
economically vulnerable group of women – from the benefits of these 
developments. Part one of this two-part article analyses the trajectory 
of the developing right to support intimate partnerships which appear 
to be based either on marriage (in the case of Muslim marriages) or 
relationships similar to marriage, including monogamy and permanent 
co-residence in the case of same-sex and opposite sex partners. This 
leaves no room to extend rights to unmarried intimate partners whose 
relationships do not fit the template of civil marriage and, in particular, 
excludes many disadvantaged African women from obtaining legal 
rights to support from their relationships.  
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1 Introduction  
The duty to provide spousal support is usually regarded as an invariable 
consequence of marriage, arising from the consortium omnis vitae between 
spouses.1 The duty continues for the duration of the marriage, unless 
extended by a court order at divorce.2 It can also be extended to the estate 
of a deceased spouse in terms of the Maintenance of Surviving Spouses 
Act.3 A third party who unlawfully causes the death of a spouse may be 
delictually liable to compensate the surviving spouse for loss of support, 
thus further extending the right to spousal support after the subsistence of 
a marriage.4 This latter incidence of the duty of support is particularly 
important to indigent spouses who would otherwise be left destitute by the 
death of their breadwinners.  
Customary law establishes duties of support between family members 
which extend far beyond those found in the common law. Wives and 
children born in wedlock are the responsibility of paternal families while 
unmarried women and their children are the responsibility of maternal 
families.5  
Initially the courts refused to recognise the duty of a customary husband to 
support his wife as a basis for a dependant's claim,6 but this was amended 
in 19637 to afford customary widows, including widows from polygynous 
marriages, whose husbands are not also in civil marriages to other women, 
dependants' actions for loss of support8 and the actio funeraria9 against third 
parties who wrongfully killed their husbands. Customary wives are regarded 
as spouses for the purposes of the Maintenance of Surviving Spouses Act10 
and their rights to support against deceased husbands' heirs and deceased 
estates have been recognised.11  
                                            
*  Elsje Bonthuys. BA LLB LLM (Stell) PhD (Cantab). Professor, School of Law, 
University of the Witwatersrand, South Africa. E-mail: Elsje.Bonthuys@wits.ac.za. 
My thanks to the members of my writing group for their valuable input on this paper. 
1  EH v SH 2012 4 SA 164 (SCA) paras 12 and 13.  
2  Section 7 of the Divorce Act 70 of 1979. 
3  Maintenance of Surviving Spouses Act 27 of 1990. 
4  Clark and Van Zyl Handbook para 1.5. 
5  Bennett Customary Law 308-310. 
6  SANTAM v Fondo 1960 2 SA 467 (A). 
7  Section 31(1) of the Black Laws Amendment Act 76 of 1963. 
8  Mayeki v Shield Insurance 1975 4 SA 370 (C).  
9  Finlay v Kutoane 1993 4 SA 675 (W). 
10  Section 1 of the Maintenance of Surviving Spouses Act 27 of 1990. 
11  Wormald v Kambule 2006 3 SA 562 (SCA). 
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When customary marriages end by divorce, the Recognition of Customary 
Marriages Act12 determines that a court dissolving the marriage may make 
an order for post-divorce maintenance. This in effect creates a right to post-
divorce spousal maintenance which did not originally exist in customary 
law.13 The rights to spousal support enjoyed by customary wives are 
therefore on a par with those of wives from civil marriages, with the caveat 
that wives whose husbands are also married to other women in terms of 
civil law are sometimes unprotected.14 Nevertheless, orders for spousal 
maintenance appear to be rarely made at divorce, often leaving women who 
are still caring for children destitute.15 
Since the advent of the interim Constitution,16 the duty of support has been 
extended to people whose Muslim marriages were not also accompanied 
by civil marriages and to same-sex couples in long-term intimate 
relationships. It has also been extended to some unmarried opposite sex-
intimate partners. However, a survey of the cases shows that those 
relationships which have qualified for an extended duty of support closely 
resemble the Western model of marriage as monogamous, stable, and 
based on a shared household, possibly with children. 
The question which this article raises is whether this trajectory of developing 
the duty of support adequately responds to the needs and situations of the 
majority of people who are in long-term intimate relationships, who are 
African and often economically disadvantaged. It does so first by describing 
the demographic information on cohabitation, which shows that for the 
largest part of the South African population intimate relationships do not 
necessarily coincide with sharing a household or with the behavioural and 
spatial patterns which epitomise monogamous, Western marriage – what I 
would term the cohabitation model of family life upon which legal relief is 
often premised.  
The next section analyses the legal mechanisms and arguments by which 
the duty of support has been extended to Muslim spouses, same-sex 
intimate partners and unmarried opposite-sex intimate partners. It argues 
that their status as married is the central motivation for extending rights to 
Muslim spouses, while in the case of same- and opposite-sex cohabitants, 
                                            
12  Section 8(4)(a) of the Recognition of Customary Marriages Act 120 of 1998. 
13  Bennett Customary Law 282; Himonga "Dissolution of a Customary Marriage" 259. 
14  Section 31(1) of the Black Laws Amendment Act 76 of 1963; definition of "spouse" 
in s 1 of the Maintenance of Surviving Spouses Act 27 of 1990. 
15  Himonga and Moore Reform of Customary Marriage 208-216. 
16  Constitution of the Republic of South Africa 200 of 1993. 
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the extension of duties of support rests upon the similarity of their 
relationships to civil marriage. This leaves no room to extend rights to 
unmarried intimate partners whose relationships do not fit the template of 
civil marriage, and in particular excludes many disadvantaged African 
women from obtaining legal rights to support from their relationships. 
The second part of the article will examine the legal avenues to fill this legal 
lacuna, exploring the space offered by customary law and common law to 
extend rights to intimate partners who do not cohabit. The rights of people 
who cohabit but who do not have any form of intimate relationship, like 
family members or long-time friends fall outside the scope of this piece.  
2 Context: Unmarried intimate relationships in South 
Africa 
Official statistics show a general decline in the number of civil and registered 
customary marriages after 2008,17 even though the population increased 
from 40.6 million in 1996 to 55.6 million in 2016.18 However, South African 
statistics must always be disaggregated by race. Statistics South Africa 
reveals that, while only 38% of African women are married or cohabiting, 
64% of white women live together or are married. 48% of adult African 
women have never been married, as compared with only 17% of white 
women.19 
It must be borne in mind that official statistics and even well-designed 
surveys don't necessarily present an accurate picture of marriage and 
cohabitation. First, the social value placed on marriage means that people 
could say that they are married when, in fact, they are cohabiting. Second, 
people's perceptions of their marital status do not necessarily accord with 
legal definitions, and they may report being married because they feel that 
this describes the permanence of their relationships or because they don't 
realise that, legally, their marriages are not fully valid.20  
Inaccurate statistics also ensue if the survey categories and questions are 
at odds with the lived experiences of respondents and the nature of marital 
practices within particular groups. Statistics about marital status are 
particularly problematic for the largest population group, African people. 
Official statistics which are based on the number of registered customary 
                                            
17  Stats SA Marriages and Divorces 2015 tables 1, 6. 
18  Stats SA Community Survey 2016 23. 
19  Stats SA Vulnerable Groups table 3.1.2. 
20  Hosegood 2013 Acta Juridica 147. 
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marriages are particularly unreliable because few customary marriages are 
registered,21 especially marriages which preceded the enactment of the 
Recognition of Customary Marriages Act. Unregistered customary 
marriages, although valid,22 would not usually be included in registration-
based statistics.  
Another challenge to accurate statistics lies in the multiple, time-consuming 
processes for customary marriage.23 This means that people may regard 
themselves as married when certain rituals and practices have been 
concluded, while other people would dispute the validity of the marriage at 
that stage.24 Moreover, the Act's broad and rather vague requirement that a 
customary marriage "must be negotiated and entered into or celebrated in 
accordance with customary law"25 has led to the proliferation of challenges 
to the validity of customary marriages at death and divorce.26 If an essential 
customary requirement has not been met, a woman could find that instead 
of being a spouse in a valid customary marriage, she is an unmarried 
cohabitant without legal rights to property or maintenance. This is also the 
case for women in polygynous marriages where the consent of first wives 
was not obtained.27  
Further complications flow from the Act's provisions on simultaneously 
existing customary and civil marriages, which have the effect of invalidating 
one of the marriages, depending on sequence and the status of these 
marriages.28 This position stands, despite serious academic criticism,29 and 
it means that one of the women would be legally classified as a cohabitant, 
despite believing for years that she was a wife.  
The provisions of the Recognition of Customary Marriages Act and their 
interpretation by courts therefore mean that large numbers of women who 
believe that they are partners in valid customary marriages may discover 
                                            
21  Himonga and Moore Reform of Customary Marriage 106-107; Makiwane et al 
Families in Mpumalanga 39-40; Budlender et al Women, Land and Customary Law 
figure 11; De Souza 2013 Acta Juridica. 
22  Section 4(9) of the Recognition of Customary Marriages Act 120 of 1998. 
23  Himonga and Moore Reform of Customary Marriage 93-96. 
24  Hosegood 2013 Acta Juridica 147, 149; Makiwane et al Families in Mpumalanga 39-
40. 
25  Section 3(1)(b) of the Recognition of Customary Marriages Act 120 of 1998. 
26  Mabena v Letsoalo 1998 2 SA 1068 (T); Motsoatsoa v Roro 2011 2 All SA 324 (GSJ); 
Fanti v Boto 2008 5 SA 405 (C). 
27  MM v MN 2013 4 SA 415 (CC). 
28  Sections 3(2) and 10(4) of the Recognition of Customary Marriages Act 120 of 1998. 
Thembesile v Thembesile 2002 2 SA 209 (T); Bennett Customary Law 236-242. 
29  Kovacs, Ndashe and Williams 2013 Acta Juridica; Himonga and Pope 2013 Acta 
Juridica; Mwambwene and Kruuse 2013 Acta Juridica. 
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only when their relationships end that they are unmarried and therefore 
have no rights to family property and spousal maintenance.  
Another group of opposite sex cohabitants are those who have not entered 
into any form of religious or cultural marriage, but who cohabit nevertheless. 
Arguments about the legal regulation of heterosexual cohabitation usually 
presume that women who knowingly cohabit outside marriage freely choose 
to do so and that they deliberately shun marriage. However, even within this 
group the picture is more complex and racially differentiated as a result of 
Apartheid policies and practices. 
Colonial and apartheid policies encouraging migrant labour by African men 
resulted in the breakdown of African families30 and have been blamed for 
the fact that, in South Africa, Africans have the lowest rates of marriage and 
the highest age at first marriage.31  
"The Apartheid migrant labour system casts a shadow into the present 
day,"32 with the result that both African men and women continue to migrate 
from rural homes to work and live in urban areas. This means that African 
people may simultaneously be members of multiple households and that 
households tend to be fluid and often intergenerational.33 In particular, it 
means that African people who share long-term sexual, emotional, and 
economic relationships do not necessarily live together in the same 
households on a permanent basis, or even for the greater part of the time.34  
Russell's work on the structure of African households contends that the 
significance of sharing a household in Western families is not replicated in 
African societies. In Western thinking marriage and adult sexual pairing are 
the basis for both family membership and household formation: "in the West, 
household and family coincide".35 By way of contrast, the African system is 
one based on patrilineal kinship, rather than on sharing households or 
marriage.36 Russell's view is borne out by statistics indicating that only 20% 
                                            
30  Posel 2006 History Workshop Journal; Posel and Rudwick 2013 Acta Juridica 175; 
Yarbrough 2015 SARS; Makiwane et al Families in Mpumalanga 9. 
31  Hosegood, McGrath and Moultrie 2009 Demographic Research 292; Hosegood 
2013 Acta Juridica 144, 158; Posel and Rudwick 2013 Acta Juridica 170-171. 
32  Makiwane et al Families in Mpumalanga 29. 
33  Makiwane et al Families in Mpumalanga 20, 23. 
34  Hosegood, McGrath and Moultrie 2009 Demographic Research 296; Hosegood 
2013 Acta Juridica 148.  
35  Russell 2003 Social Dynamics 11. 
36  Russell 2003 Social Dynamics 9, 10; Hosegood, McGrath and Moultrie 2009 
Demographic Research 299. 
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of African households are headed by married or cohabiting couples, as 
compared with 60% of white households.37  
The concept of cohabitation implies living together or sharing a household, 
and extending rights to people on this basis may misunderstand and 
misrepresent sexual and social arrangements in the largest part of the 
South African population. It may also reflect a Western understanding of 
family status and either deliberately ignore or neglect the nature of 
relationships amongst African people. For these reasons Hosegood et al 
suggest replacing cohabitation with a broader concept of conjugal 
relationships in statistical information about marriage and families in South 
Africa.38 It may be a sensible strategy also for the formulation of legal rights 
and duties of support, since a legal strategy which extends rights only to 
cohabiting couples who resemble Western-inspired nuclear families in the 
sense of permanently and exclusively sharing a single household not only 
excludes the majority of South Africans, but also relies on the Western 
assumption that nuclear families are the norm which all other families should 
replicate in order to be worthy of legal recognition. 
Because of the decrease in the incidence of marriage, particularly amongst 
African people, and the fact that many African people do not necessarily 
cohabit with sexual partners in a single household, African women may be 
in long-term relationships with men even though they don't share a 
household. These men may contribute financially to their partners' 
households, even though they do not live in them permanently. The women 
may also be in long-term relationships with men who are also married or 
who cohabit with other women.39  
Of this group of women, those who live in woman-headed and multi-
generational (ie, containing more than two generations) households are 
particularly vulnerable. Nuclear, single or two-generation families occur 
most frequently amongst the higher socio-economic classes, while poorer 
households tend to be multi-generational and headed by women.40 The 
latest statistics show that 43% of African households are female-headed as 
                                            
37  Amaoteng and Heaton 2015 SARS 69. 
38  Hosegood, McGrath and Moultrie 2009 Demographic Research 294; Hosegood 
2013 Acta Juridica 161. 
39  Goldblatt 2003 SALJ 613. 
40  Stats SA Income Dynamics table 3; Makiwane et al Families in Mpumalanga 9; 
Hosegood 2013 Acta Juridica 162. 
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compared with 40% of Coloured, 30% of White and 28% percent of Indian 
households41. 
Whereas 46% of male-headed households are nuclear, 48% of female-
headed households are extended.42 The disadvantage experienced by 
extended female-headed households may result from gender disparities 
within the population in which formal employment and educational 
achievement are markedly higher for men than for women and lower for 
people of African descent than for other population groups.43 Households 
headed by men will benefit from the educational and employment 
advantages of their heads, while female-headed households tend to lack 
these benefits. However, the evidence also shows that while 19% of male-
headed households have no employed members, 39% of female-headed 
households are in this position, which reduces the economic resources 
available to female-headed households. This effect is even more 
pronounced for African female-headed households.44 For this reason 
female-headed households tend to rely to a greater extent on remittances 
from migrant family members,45 which would include financial support from 
intimate partners. 
Another disadvantage faced by female-headed households is their 
disproportionate responsibility for children. While female-headed 
households tend to be extended families,46 statistics also show that 65% of 
African children live in extended family households and only 32% in nuclear 
families. While 40% of South African children live with their mothers only, 
only 3% live with their fathers only and 34% in nuclear families.47 This 
implies that households headed by women have greater responsibilities for 
day-to-day childcare and the financial provision for children. Moreover, both 
within families which contain fathers and within those which don't, women 
bear a disproportionate responsibility to care for children and vulnerable 
family members.48 This caring work is unpaid and reduces women’s and 
girls' opportunities to continue their education and access formal 
employment.  
                                            
41  Stats SA Vulnerable Groups table 3.2.1. 
42  Stats SA Vulnerable Groups table 3.2.2. 
43  Stats SA Vulnerable Groups tables 3.3.6, 3.6.2. 
44  Stats SA Vulnerable Groups table 3.3.2. 
45  Makiwane et al Families in Mpumalanga 30. 
46  Stats SA Vulnerable Groups table 3.2.2. 
47  Stats SA Vulnerable Groups tables 1.2.3, 1.2.4; Posel and Rudwick 2013 Acta 
Juridica 174-175. 
48  Makiwane et al Families in Mpumalanga 52, 53. 
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In this section I have used statistics to demonstrate that, while there is a 
general decline in marriage, African women find themselves in a uniquely 
detrimental position. First, certain characteristics of and requirements for 
customary marriage means that many African women may erroneously 
believe that they are married. When it emerges that their marriages are 
invalid, they have no rights to support from their partners. Second, many 
African women may be in long-term intimate relationships which do not 
involve permanent cohabitation. Finally, many African women who are in 
intimate relationships nevertheless live without their intimate partners - in 
multi-generation and woman-headed households, often together with other 
female family members. These households are significantly poorer than 
couple-headed and male-headed households and they bear a 
disproportionate burden of care for dependent family members like children. 
They are therefore more dependent on financial contributions from other 
family members, including intimate male partners. The existence of a legal 
duty of support can go some way towards alleviating their financial distress, 
not only by creating rights against partners during the existence of intimate 
relationship, but also by extending to them the dependants' action for loss 
of support when male partners are killed. 
In the next sections I will briefly sketch the contours of the post-constitutional 
extensions of the duty of support to unmarried intimate partners. These 
extensions, I argue, do not make provision for the women described in this 
paragraph.  
3  Post-constitutional developments in the spousal duty to 
support 
After the enactment of the interim Constitution, the common law duty of 
support has been gradually extended to three categories of previously 
excluded relationships: Muslim marriages, same-sex cohabitants and 
unmarried opposite sex cohabitants. I will first discuss Muslim marriages 
and same-sex cohabitants and then give a more detailed exposition of the 
cases extending rights to opposite-sex unmarried intimate partners. My aim 
is to analyse whether the legal arguments and mechanisms by which rights 
have been extended to these groups could also be used to extend rights to 
African women  
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3.1  Spouses in Muslim marriages 
The pre-constitutional position is found in Ismail v Ismail,49 in which the 
Appellate Division declined to enforce the terms of the Muslim marriage 
contract (including the husband's duty to support) on the basis that the 
potentially polygynous nature of the marriage rendered the contract contra 
bonos mores and thus void. The 1997 judgment of Ryland v Edros invoked 
the interim Constitution to uphold the provisions of the marriage contract, 
which created a duty to pay maintenance, on the basis that:50  
Can it be said, since the coming into operation of the new Constitution, that a 
contract concluded by parties which arises from a marriage relationship 
entered into by them in accordance with the rites of their religion and which as 
a fact is monogamous is `contrary to the accepted customs and usages which 
are regarded as morally binding upon all members of our society' or is 
`fundamentally opposed to our principles and institutions'? … [I]t is quite 
inimical to all the values of the new South Africa for one group to impose its 
values on another and that the Courts should only brand a contract as 
offensive to public policy if it is offensive to those values which are shared by 
the community at large, by all right-thinking people in the community and not 
only by one section of it. 
This prominence of the need legally to recognise marriages which were 
conducted in accordance with a major religion also motivated the decision 
in Amod, which related to a claim for loss of support by a widow in a 
monogamous Muslim marriage.51 The Constitutional Court in Daniels v 
Campbell52 confirmed that the word "spouse" in the Maintenance of 
Surviving Spouses Act includes widows from monogamous Muslim 
marriages and that such wives therefore had rights to maintenance, while 
TM v ZJ53 recognised the spousal duty of support in the context of a Rule 
43 application. 
In Amod the court emphasised the fact that, although potentially 
polygynous, the marriage was in fact monogamous,54 but subsequent cases 
extended the duty of support also to polygynous marriages, including 
maintenance subsequent to an Islamic divorce.55  
                                            
49  Ismail v Ismail 1983 1 SA 1006 (A). 
50  Ryland v Edros 1997 2 SA 690 (C) 707E-H, my emphasis. 
51  Amod v Multilateral Motor Vehicle Accidents Fund 1999 4 SA 1319 (SCA) (hereafter 
the Amod case) para 20-23. 
52  Daniels v Campbell 2004 5 SA 331 (CC) (hereafter the Daniels case). 
53  TM v ZJ 2016 1 SA 71 (KZD). Also see AM v RM 2010 2 SA 223 (ECP). 
54  Amod case paras 20, 24.  
55  Khan v Khan 2005 2 SA 272 (T) (hereafter the Khan case); Rose v Rose 2015 2 All 
SA 352 (WCC) (hereafter the Rose case). 
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The cases extending duties of support to monogamous Muslim spouses 
tend to focus on the fact that these relationships establish marriages which 
merit legal recognition in terms of the changed boni mores and the need to 
overcome discrimination on the bases of religion56 and gender,57 rather than 
the enforcement of the marriage contract.58 Cases which extend rights to 
spouses in polygynous marriages have also used this argument,59 but in 
addition they have relied upon the constitutional case judgment in Hassam 
v Jacobs60 to argue that granting fewer rights to wives from polygynous 
Muslim marriages than those which are afforded wives from polygynous 
customary marriages, infringes the dignity of Muslim widows and by 
implication unfairly discriminates against them on the basis of marital 
status.61 Although the contractual nature of Muslim marriages is recognised, 
the more prominent reasons for extending rights and duties of support are 
based on normative concerns about equality, non-discrimination and 
affording legal legitimacy to Muslim rules around marriage and family 
formation. 
3.2 Same-sex intimate partners 
Whereas courts recognising rights to spousal support in Muslim marriages 
focus on the celebration of the religious marriage, courts granting rights to 
same-sex couples have emphasised both their functional similarity to 
marriage and the fact that the partners had "undertaken" reciprocal duties 
of support to one another. The simultaneous reliance on these somewhat 
contradictory motivations is well illustrated in the Satchwell judgment:62 
Inasmuch as the provisions in question afford benefits to spouses but not to 
same-sex partners who have established a permanent life relationship similar 
in other respects to marriage, including accepting the duty to support one 
another, such provisions constitute unfair discrimination. I should emphasise, 
however, that s 9 generally does not require benefits provided to spouses to 
be extended to all same-sex partners where no reciprocal duties of support 
have been undertaken. The Constitution cannot impose obligations towards 
partners where those partners themselves have failed to undertake such 
obligations. 
                                            
56  Amod case paras 20, 24. 
57  Daniels case para 22.  
58  See, however, Hoosein v Dangor 2010 2 All SA 55 (WCC) (hereafter the Hoosein 
case) para 16, which holds that the Amod case merely recognised the "contractual 
duty of support which arises from a Muslim marriage". 
59  Khan case para 10. 
60  Hassam v Jacobs 2009 5 SA 572 (CC) para 46, about the constitutionality of the 
Intestate Succession Act 81 of 1987. 
61  Rose case paras 52, 56, 57.  
62  Satchwell v President of the Republic of South Africa 2002 6 SA 1 (CC) (hereafter 
the Satchwell case) paras 23, 24, my emphasis. 
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This ambivalence is reflected throughout the cases recognising duties of 
support for same-sex couples. While Langemaat63 emphasised the 
marriage-like qualities of the relationships, the Du Plessis case was based 
both on the marriage-like nature of the relationship, including an unofficial 
marriage ceremony,64 and the parties' undertaking of reciprocal duties of 
support.65 In fact, the argument went, the marriage-like nature of the 
relationship provided evidence that the parties had undertaken (or 
contracted) to support one another.66  
Courts in these cases frequently refer to the fact that the same-sex partners 
were not able marry, thereby forestalling arguments that opposite sex 
cohabitants should receive rights similar to those of same-sex couples. In 
Satchwell the court cautioned that:67  
Same-sex partners cannot be lumped together with unmarried heterosexual 
partners without further ado. The latter have chosen to stay as cohabiting 
partners for a variety of reasons, which are unnecessary to traverse here, 
without marrying although generally there is no legal obstacle to their doing 
so. The former cannot enter into a valid marriage. 
Their lack of a choice to marry is therefore often used to justify the extension 
of duties of support to same-sex couples. 
3.3 Unmarried opposite-sex intimate partners 
3.3.1 Domestic Partnerships Draft Bill  
Even before the enactment of the Constitution,68 legal rights and obligations 
were afforded to unmarried opposite-sex partners by way of legislation, and 
further legislative amendments followed upon the extension of legal rights 
to same-sex partners.69  
In 2006 the South African Law Reform Commission Report recommended 
a Domestic Partnerships Act which would afford rights to both same-sex 
and opposite-sex unmarried partners under two legal regimes established 
for registered and unregistered domestic partnerships respectively. 
                                            
63  Langemaat v Minister of Safety and Security 1998 3 SA 312 (T) (hereafter the 
Langemaat case) 314B, 316E-I. 
64  Du Plessis v Road Accident Fund 2004 1 SA 359 (SCA) (hereafter the Du Plessis 
case) paras 12, 15, 25. 
65  Du Plessis case paras 13, 16. 
66  Du Plessis case paras 14, 15. 
67  Satchwell case para 16. 
68  Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996. 
69  See generally Heaton and Kruger South African Family Law 261-266. 
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However, following the enactment of the Civil Union Act,70 the 
implementation of the provisions affording rights to unmarried same- and 
opposite-sex partners was delayed and captured in a separate Draft 
Domestic Partnerships Bill in 2008 which has not yet been enacted.71  
The Draft Bill distinguishes between registered and unregistered domestic 
partnerships. Registered partnerships cannot exist at the same time as valid 
civil or customary marriages or other registered partnerships72 and are 
therefore essentially monogamous. These partnerships give rise to 
automatic (ex lege) duties of support between partners, which may be 
extended after the dissolution of the partnership if the parties agree or by 
way of a court order for post-dissolution maintenance. The Maintenance of 
Surviving Spouses Act would apply to survivors of such partnerships.73  
Registered partnerships would grant the strongest rights to support, but they 
may be of limited use for the most vulnerable women, first because they 
must be registered. Even if poor rural women have information about these 
partnerships, they may be unable to persuade reluctant partners to register 
their relationships for the same reasons as they are unable to insist on the 
registration of customary marriages,74 and they may be unable to afford the 
time and costs associated with registration, which would presumably be 
conducted in a Home Affairs office or a satellite office. Moreover, the 
requirement of monogamy for registered partnerships would exclude those 
women whose partners are also married or partners in other registered 
partnerships.  
Unregistered partnerships, on the other hand, do not give rise to a duty of 
support, but partners may, after the partnerships have ended as a result of 
either death or separation, apply to a court for maintenance.75  
Unlike the definition of a registered partnership, the definition of an 
unregistered partnership does not exclude those partnerships which co-
exist with marriages or registered partnerships. However, clause 26(4) 
determines that: 
                                            
70  Civil Union Act 17 of 2006, allowing same-sex couples to marry. 
71  For more detailed discussion of the Draft Bill see Smith 2011 SALJ; Smith 
"Dissolution of a Life Partnership" 467-475. 
72  Clause 4 of the Draft Domestic Partnerships Bill. 
73  Clauses 9, 14, 18, 19 of the Draft Domestic Partnerships Bill. 
74  See De Souza 2013 Acta Juridica. Because clause 6(1) of the Draft Bill requires "any 
two persons" to register their partnership, women cannot register a partnership by 
themselves. 
75  Clauses 26-29 of the Draft Domestic Partnerships Bill. 
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[a] court may not make an order under this Act regarding a relationship of a 
person who at the time of that relationship, was also a spouse in a civil 
marriage or a partner in a civil union or a registered domestic partnership with 
a third person. 
This effectively precludes a court from granting rights to support to an 
unregistered cohabitant in a relationship which co-exists with a valid 
marriage or a registered partnership. Presumably the partners may still 
agree upon post-relationship support, but in the case of disputes courts may 
not intervene. This provision does not, however, preclude court orders if a 
partner is involved in another unregistered partnership, or a customary 
marriage, but that would not assist the large numbers of women who are in 
partnerships with men who are simultaneously married in civil law or are in 
other registered partnerships.  
Another issue is the definitional criteria for unregistered partnerships, which, 
according to clause 1 of the Draft Bill, "means a relationship between two 
adult persons who live as a couple and who are not related by family". The 
factors to determine whether a court will grant relief to unmarried partners 
are set out in clause 26(2) as: 
(a)  the duration and nature of the relationship; 
(b)  the nature and extent of common residence; 
(c)  the degree of financial dependence or interdependence, and any 
arrangements for financial support, between the unregistered partners;  
(d)  the ownership, use and acquisition of property; 
(e)  the degree of mutual commitment to a shared life; 
(f)  the care and support of children of the domestic partnership; 
(g)  the performance of household duties; 
(h)  the reputation and public aspects of the relationship; and  
(i)  the relationship status of the unregistered partners with third parties. 
Some of these factors, especially (b) and (i), could be interpreted in ways 
which would deter non-cohabiting intimate partners from being afforded 
legal rights against one another. On the other hand, courts which have a 
more accurate understanding of how intimate partnerships function outside 
of Western, middle-class, urban norms may also rely on the wider picture 
presented by the other factors to extend relief to partners who do not 
permanently cohabit or whose relationships co-exist with other intimate 
relationships. In any event, clause 26(3) determines that: 
[a] finding in respect of any of the matters mentioned in subsection (2), or in 
respect of any combination of them, is not essential before a court may make 
an order under this Chapter, and regard may be had to further matters and 
weight be attached to such matters as may seem appropriate in the 
circumstances of the case. 
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This sub-clause would assist courts to formulate a more extensive notion of 
what constitutes an unregistered domestic partnership, and the Draft Bill 
may therefore provide a promising avenue through which to afford rights to 
all women in unmarried intimate partnerships. It may therefore be a useful 
strategy to lobby or litigate for the enactment of the legislation. On the other 
hand, the wording of the Draft Bill may equally well be interpreted to exclude 
women who don't share a permanent household with their partners or 
whose relationships coincide with other relationships. This is plausible 
because it would echo the current and past legal interpretations, which have 
extended rights mainly to those partnerships which most closely resemble 
monogamous Western, nuclear families, to which I turn below. 
3.3.2  Volks v Robinson and its consequences for the common law  
The extension of rights to support to unmarried opposite-sex cohabitants 
ran into difficulties as a result of the two majority judgments in the Volks v 
Robinson76 case, in which an unmarried opposite-sex cohabitant of some 
16 years sought to institute an action for maintenance against the estate of 
her deceased partner in terms of the Maintenance of Surviving Spouses 
Act.  
The gist of the judgments by Constitutional Court Justices Skweyia and 
Ncgobo, with whom the majority judges agreed, was that, even if it were 
accepted that the exclusion of unmarried cohabitants from the Act 
discriminated on the ground of marital status, this discrimination should not 
be regarded as unfair. Because the centrality of marriage is recognised in 
our Constitution and in international law, the state may legitimately 
differentiate between married and unmarried couples by granting rights and 
benefits to married couples only.77 Although Skweyiya J recognised the dire 
economic and social circumstances faced by some female cohabitants, he 
held that this inequality was not created by the Maintenance of Surviving 
Spouses Act and that it was therefore not the task of this statute or of the 
court in this matter to cure their social and economic ills.78 Crucial to both 
judgments was the argument based on choice, which was so central in 
extending rights to same-sex couples, namely that:79  
[t]he law expects those heterosexual couples who desire the consequences 
ascribed to this type of relationship to signify their acceptance of those 
consequences by entering into a marriage relationship. Those who do not 
                                            
76  Volks v Robinson 2005 5 BCLR 446 (CC) (hereafter the Volks case). 
77  Volks case paras 50-57, 80-87. 
78  Volks case paras 59, 64-69. 
79  Volks case para 92. 
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wish such consequences to flow from their relationship remain free to enter 
into some other form of relationship and decide what consequences should 
flow from their relationships. 
By way of contrast, although the court a quo in Robinson v Volks also 
focused on the partners' choices, it held that failing to give effect to people's 
choices about important aspects of their lives negates their fundamental 
human dignity.80 This court's view of the nature of the choice was directly 
opposed to that of the Constitutional Court. It held that, given the couple's 
sharing of resources over many years, it would be illogical to rule that the 
mere failure to marry was an indication that they did not want any financial 
consequences to flow from their relationship.81 The focus in the court a quo 
was therefore on the implications of the choice to share resources over time, 
while the Constitutional Court majority focused on the choice not to marry.  
Despite being criticised by Justices Mokgoro and O'Regan for undermining 
the very purpose of the constitutional prohibition of discrimination on the 
basis of marital status and by Sachs J for its narrowness and the essentially 
circular nature of the arguments,82 the Constitutional Court majority view 
stands, and together with it, the liberal view of choice upon which it is 
premised. Any future litigation will either have to find a way around this 
argument or persuade the courts that this vision of choice fails to reflect the 
real-life options of many South Africans. I deal in more detail with this issue 
in part II of this article.  
Notwithstanding rigorous academic criticism,83 the Constitutional Court's 
reasoning in Volks has since been applied strictly to deny an unmarried 
opposite sex partner the right to institute the dependant's action for loss of 
support.84 Nevertheless, academic commentators have argued that the 
Volks judgment does not extend to all incidents of the duty of support. Smith 
and Heaton have contended that the impact of the Volks judgment is limited 
to the duty of support as between the partners and would not necessarily 
apply to the dependant's action for loss of support, which aims to impose 
                                            
80  Robinson v Volks 2004 6 SA 288 (C) 295I-J (hereafter the Robinson case). 
81  Robinson case 299D-G. 
82  Volks case paras 118, 150, 151. 
83  See Lind 2005 Acta Juridica; Schäfer 2006 SALJ 632-633; Albertyn 2007 SAJHR 
266-267; Kruuse 2009 SAJHR 384; Smith 2010 PELJ; Smith and Heaton 2012 
THRHR. 
84  Meyer v Road Accident Fund (TPD) (unreported) case number 29950/2004 of 28 
March 2006 (hereafter the Meyer case). 
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liability on a third party who had wrongfully caused the death of a 
breadwinner.85  
A further argument is that the duty of support can arise either ex lege or as 
a result of an "undertaking" or a contract between the partners.86 According 
to this view Volks eliminates only the ex lege duty of support, but it does not 
preclude unmarried couples from creating duties of support by way of 
contract.87 
This argument, and the solution it offers to get around the constraints 
imposed by choice argument in the Volks majority judgment, appears to 
have found favour on the bench. Although it held, on the facts, that the 
plaintiff was an unreliable witness whose testimony that there was an 
agreement to support should not be believed, the Supreme Court of Appeal 
in McDonald v Young held that the decisions in Amod, Du Plessis, Satchwell 
and Khan were based on the recognition of a contractual duty of support 
between the cohabitants.88 Subsequently, in a dependant's action for loss 
of support, the court in Verheem v Road Accident Fund emphasised that 
the agreement to support "was not merely an undertaking but was in fact a 
binding contract in that the deceased clearly did so with the intention of 
being legally bound."89  
Following upon the emphasis on contract in the McDonald case, the 
Supreme Court of Appeal in Paixão v Road Accident Fund90 issued an 
extremely puzzling judgment in a dependant's action for loss of support, 
where the deceased was party to another marriage until shortly before his 
death in a vehicle accident. The final divorce was granted only months 
before his death.91 Nevertheless, while being married to another woman, 
the court held, he became engaged to the plaintiff and undertook a duty to 
maintain the plaintiff and her children and in fact maintained them for a 
number of years. The unacknowledged conundrum is the long-established 
common law rule that an engagement by a married person is illegal because 
                                            
85  Smith and Heaton 2012 THRHR 479. 
86  The distinction which forms the basis of this argument originates from Justice Sachs' 
minority judgment in the Volks case paras 214-9. 
87  Smith and Heaton 2012 THRHR 477. 
88  McDonald v Young 2012 3 SA 1 (SCA) paras 15, 16 (hereafter the McDonald case). 
89  Verheem v Road Accident Fund 2010 2 SA 409 (GP) para 12. This distinguishes the 
case from the Meyer case para 27, in which Ledwaba J held that the parties had 
merely "undertaken" to support one another, but that this did not constitute a legally 
binding contract.  
90  Paixão v Road Accident Fund 2012 6 SA 377 (SCA) (hereafter Paixão SCA). 
91  Paixão SCA paras 5, 9. 
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it is contrary to public policy.92 Moreover, contracts which are closely 
associated with other illegal contracts93 and contracts which undermine the 
institution of marriage94 are likewise invalid. These rules would invalidate 
both the "engagement" between the deceased and the plaintiff and also the 
agreement to support the plaintiff while still a spouse in a valid marriage.  
For this reason, the court a quo95 held that the agreement to support was 
void for illegality. The Supreme Court of Appeal must have been aware of 
these rules, because it held that:96  
this case does not concern breach of a promise to marry, but requires us to 
consider whether or not the nature of the relationship between the parties 
gave rise to a reciprocal duty of support which the law must protect. In my 
view, the obligations undertaken by the deceased were akin to a pactum de 
contrahendo, which is an agreement to make a contract in the future. This is 
different from a mere promise to contract, which is not binding. In a case of a 
pactum de contrahendo one or both parties may undertake to perform certain 
duties before the 'main agreement' comes into effect. Such undertakings are 
enforceable… 
It is not entirely clear from the paragraph whether the classification of the 
agreement as "akin to a pactum de contrahendo" refers to the promise to 
marry or to become engaged in future, or to the contract to support an 
intimate partner by an engaged person. Both versions would be 
problematic, since pacta de contrahendo are subject to the same public 
policy concerns as all other contracts and would be invalid for the same 
reasons.  
This whole aspect of the judgment is questionable, but it can be explained 
by the need to get around the Volks judgment. On the one hand, Volks holds 
there can be no ex lege duty of support, but on the other hand the contract, 
which would have allowed the SCA to evade Volks, is invalid because it co-
exists with a valid civil marriage to another person. What is significant in the 
Paixão decision is that the court distinguishes this case from Volks, first on 
the basis that this was a contractual claim, while Volks involved the 
                                            
92  Staples v Marquard 1919 CPD 181; Friedman v Harris 1928 CPD 43; Claassen v 
Van der Watt 1969 3 SA 68 (T); Lloyd v Mitchell 2004 2 All SA 542 (C); Benefeld v 
West 2011 2 SA 379 (GSJ). 
93  Richards v Guardian Assurance 1907 TH 24; Pietzsch v Thompson 1972 4 SA 122 
(R). 
94  Braude v Braude (1899) 16 SC 565; Chadwick v Chadwick 1914 CPD 1008; Karp v 
Kuhn 1948 4 SA 825 (T); Martens v Martens 1952 3 SA 771 (W); G v F 1966 3 SA 
579 (O); Maseko v Maseko 1992 3 SA 190 (W). 
95  Paixao v Road Accident Fund 2011 ZAGPJHC 68 (1 July 2011) para 29 (hereafter 
Paixao a quo). 
96  SCA judgment in Paixão para 22. 
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question97 "whether a spousal benefit arising from a legally recognised 
marriage should also be available to a surviving partner of a life partnership" 
and, second, on the basis of the sui generis nature of the dependant's action 
for loss of support, which had been developed to reflect community 
perceptions and public policy.98  
The most important avenue for circumventing the effects of the Volks 
majority judgment has been to base the duty of support on a contract 
between the partners rather than to extend the ex lege duties of support. 
The jurisprudence on unmarried opposite-sex relationships indicates a 
gradual move away from an initial emphasis on the ambiguous concept of 
"undertakings" in earlier cases like Satchwell – which can create non-legal 
moral obligations rather than legally enforceable obligations - to more 
explicitly contractual terminology, concepts and rules. The most recent 
cases of McDonald and especially Paixão appear to have crystalised and 
solidified the shift towards contract and the use of contractual terminology 
and concepts. 
However, despite adhering to the rhetoric of the agreement as the basis of 
duties of support between unmarried intimate partners, there appears to be 
a degree of residual ambiguity which is reflected in the factors which courts 
take into account in deciding whether a contract has been proved. There 
appears to be a mixture of factors which would indicate the conclusion of 
tacit contracts together with other factors which are more indicative of 
community legal convictions and boni mores.99 The confusion is illustrated 
in the SCA judgment in Paixão:100  
Proving the existence of a life partnership entails more than showing that the 
parties cohabited and jointly contributed to the upkeep of the common home. 
It entails, in my view, demonstrating that the partnership was akin to and had 
similar characteristics — particularly a reciprocal duty of support — to a 
marriage. Its existence would have to be proved by credible evidence of a 
conjugal relationship in which the parties supported and maintained each 
other. The implied inference to be drawn from these proven facts must be that 
the parties, in the absence of an express agreement, agreed tacitly that their 
cohabitation included assuming reciprocal commitments — ie a duty to 
support — to each other. 
The following categories of factors have been considered in the cases: 
                                            
97  SCA judgment in Paixão para 26 in which it summarises the legal question in the 
Volks case. 
98  Paras 12, 13, 36. 
99  Also see the factors listed by Smith "Dissolution of a Life Partnership" 425. 
100  Paixão SCA para 29. 
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The nature of the relationship: 
 the marriage-like or conjugal nature of the relationship;101  
 the duration of the relationship;102  
 the fact that the couple shared a household;103  
 whether the parties had children together;104 and 
 the fact that one partner had contributed to raising the other 
partner's children.105  
Undertaking duties of reciprocal support: 
 actions of reciprocal support over time;106  
 the financial dependence of one party upon the other;107 and 
 the contents of the partners' wills;108  
Community perceptions of the relationship: 
 the fact that the parties were regarded as a committed couple by 
family members and friends;109  
 the fact that many statutes include unmarried cohabitants;110  
 the fact that the parties had concluded an Islamic marriage;111 and 
 changes in the boni mores.112  
The partners' marital status: 
 whether the parties planned to get married in future, but had been 
prevented from doing so;113  
                                            
101  Meyer case para 29; Volks case paras 122, 193; Du Plessis case paras 15, 25; 
Langemaat case paras 314B, 316G; Satchwell case paras 4, 23. 
102  Volks case paras 3, 121; Meyer case para 31; Du Plessis case para 3; Langemaat 
case 316H-I; Satchwell case para 25. 
103  Verheem case para 2; Langemaat case 316H-I; Satchwell case para 5. 
104  Verheem case para 2; Volks case para 3. 
105  Verheem case para 2, Meyer case para 3. 
106  Paixão SCA para 8, 19; McDonald case para 21; Volks case para 5; Du Plessis case 
para 4; Satchwell case para 25. 
107  McDonald case para 21; Volks case para 128; Du Plessis case para 4; Khan case 
para 10; Satchwell case para 5. 
108  Paixão SCA para 20; McDonald case para 21; Volks case para 7; Meyer case para 
31; Du Plessis case para 4; Satchwell case paras 5, 25. 
109  Verheem case para 2; Meyer case para 29; Du Plessis case para 3; Paixão SCA 
para 20; Satchwell case para 4. 
110  Volks case para 178; Rose case paras 40-47. 
111  AM v RM 2010 2 SA 223 (ECP) para 5, 6; Amod case para 20; Rose case paras 49, 
50. 
112  Amod case para 23; Khan case para 11; Paixão SCA para 13; Meyer case para 28. 
113  Verheem case para 2; Paixão SCA para 21; Meyer case para 29. 
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 the fact that the partners were unable to enter into a legal 
marriage;114  
 the fact that the parties had not married, even though there was 
nothing preventing them from doing so;115 and 
 the fact that one of the partners was simultaneously married to 
another person.116  
Factors which would typically prove contractual consensus: 
 the existence of a document confirming the agreement;117  
 express statements that the one would support the other;118  
 the existence of other contracts between the partners;119 and 
 the reliability or unreliability of the litigants' testimony.120  
Most of these factors are more relevant to the existence of an ex lege duty 
of support than to the question of whether the parties had a contract to 
support one another. However, this apparent confusion may be the result of 
the fact that many of the cases deal with enforcing the duty of support 
against third parties in the dependants' action.  
According to Smith and Heaton's analysis, the dependants' action 
comprises two separate questions – first whether there is actually a duty of 
support between the partners, whether ex contractu or ex lege.121 Once a 
duty of support has been established, the question arises whether this duty 
of support should be recognised for the purposes of the dependant's action 
– which is to be decided according to public policy or the boni mores. 
Because courts often deal with both aspects simultaneously, the contractual 
and public policy factors tend to be mixed up. This would have provided a 
plausible explanation for the mixture of factors used by the courts, had the 
public policy or boni mores-related factors been used only in the cases on 
the dependants' action for loss of support. However, they are found 
throughout all the cases. 
                                            
114  Du Plessis case paras 3, 14; Langemaat case 314B; Satchwell case paras 4, 16. 
115  Meyer case paras 29, 32; Volks case paras 3, 91-94. 
116  Paixão a quo paras 29, 40, 41; Rose case paras 20, 30. 
117  McDonald case para 4. 
118  Du Plessis case para 15. 
119  McDonald case para 22. 
120  McDonald case para 11. 
121  Smith and Heaton 2012 THRHR 476-478. 
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4 Potential for extending rights to support to African 
women in unmarried opposite-sex intimate relationships 
Having surveyed and analysed the three strains of cases developing the 
rights to support for unmarried intimate partners, I can now begin to answer 
the question posed in this article: to what extent do existing legal 
developments in this area address the needs of the largest and most 
vulnerable groups of women in unmarried intimate relationships? 
It would be fair to say that the essential justification of the cases which 
extend duties of support to Muslim wives and widows is the need to 
recognise and give effect to the Islamic marital relationship. These 
relationships are recognised and consequences are afforded to them 
essentially because they are marriages conducted in terms of a recognised, 
major religion. The gist of this view is summarised in the Rose case, which 
summarised the ratio of the Constitutional Court in Daniels v Campbell as 
follows:122 
The Constitutional Court held that parties to a Muslim 'marriage' were to be 
considered spouses because they were married, albeit that their marriages 
were not solemnised under the Marriage Act and not recognised as valid 
under South African law. 
This justification for extending rights to support could provide an avenue to 
argue that women who find, after many years, that their customary 
marriages are invalid – either because some formality has not been 
satisfied, or because, unbeknownst to them their husbands were 
simultaneously married to other women either in customary or civil law - 
were essentially married and should therefore have rights to support from 
their spouses. The central problem is, however, that unlike Muslim 
marriages, which are fully valid in religious terms, these marriages are not 
valid according to contemporary customary law, as reflected in the 
Recognition of Customary Marriages Act and its associated jurisprudence. 
The more accurate analogy to Muslim marriages would be unregistered 
customary marriages, which do receive full legal recognition. Affording 
rights to support on the basis of marriage would not serve to extend rights 
to those women who never went through any part of a customary marriage 
ceremony, of whom there are many. The jurisprudence on Muslim 
marriages does therefore not assist those women described in section 2 of 
this article.  
                                            
122  Rose case para 47, which gives the court's summary of the ratio of the Daniels 
decision. 
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Turning to the reasoning in the same-sex cases, my analysis shows a 
combination of the choice-based or contractual rationale and the marital 
rationale for extending duties of support. On the one hand, courts hold that 
same-sex couples should receive legal protection to counterbalance the fact 
that they cannot choose to marry, and because they demonstrated their 
commitment to one another by choosing or undertaking to support one 
another. On the other hand, they should also receive protection because 
their relationships are so marriage-like. The injustice of being unable to 
choose marriage whilst having such evidently marriage-like relationships 
justifies extending rights to certain same-sex couples. The simplistic 
argument based on either having or not having a legal choice to marry, 
which was so central to the reasoning in the same-sex cases, foreshadows 
the same one-dimensional use of choice in the unmarried opposite-sex 
cases.123 
Furthermore, we should interrogate the precise nature of the marriage-like 
relationships which these same-sex couples have. All the litigants to whom 
rights and duties of support have been afforded resemble monogamously 
married heterosexual couples. None of their relationships co-existed with 
civil marriages or other cohabitation relationships; all shared a household 
as a sexual and family unit. Fundamentally they conformed to the Western 
notion of life-long, committed, monogamous, sexually exclusive marriage as 
an indication of family status. Academics have commented that this shows 
the continued centrality of Western, Christian marriage as the template for 
the extension of conjugal rights to other intimate relationships.124 The 
Western paradigm of marriage remains the basis for what constitutes a 
sufficiently conjugal relationship and for what is defined as a family and, for 
this reason, this line of reasoning would exclude the majority of African 
women who have intimate relationships outside of marriage. 
Exactly the same is true for the cases which have extended the duty of 
support to unmarried opposite-sex partners, all of which involve 
relationships which approximate the ideals of Western, Christian marriage 
and nuclear, household-based family structure to a remarkable extent. Even 
though these cases are supposedly based on contract, the marriage-like 
qualities of these relationships feature prominently in the list of factors which 
courts use to decide whether the parties have concluded agreements to 
support one another. The true reason for the inclusion of the wide array of 
                                            
123  The effect of choice on the issue was brought to the fore in the subsequent cases of 
Gory v Kolver 2007 4 SA 97 (CC) and Laubscher v Duplan 2017 2 SA 264 (CC). 
That issue will be discussed in part 2 of this article.  
124  For instance De Vos 2004 SAJHR; De Vos 2007 SAJHR; Bonthuys 2007 SAJHR. 
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non-contract-related factors in these cases may well be to assess and 
regulate the extent to which the relationships in question comply with 
Western norms of family formation and marital status. Many African women 
who need support from their long-term intimate partners would not be able 
to meet these criteria, both because their relationships don't involve 
permanent cohabitation and because their intimate relationships may co-
exist with other relationships, whether customary or civil marriages, or with 
other unmarried intimate relationships. 
The only exception is provided by the Supreme Court of Appeal judgment 
in Paixão, where the deceased had been married to a woman in Portugal, 
but the marriage relationship seemed to have been dysfunctional for a long 
time. What is interesting in this case is not only the tortuousness of the 
attempts to get around the common law rules on illegality discussed above, 
but the Court's curious treatment of the Portuguese marriage. Cachalia JA 
remarked that, before the divorce the deceased "felt constrained not to 
marry Mrs Paixao before his divorce was also concluded and recognised in 
Portugal" but that once the divorce was granted "[t]here were now no legal 
or practical impediments to his marrying Mrs Paixao."125 By playing down 
the seriousness and legal consequences of the existing marriage these 
dicta contradict the unqualified and indisputable common law rules against 
agreements to enter into marriage by people who are in existing civil 
marriages.  
However, the dicta raise the difficult issue of the extent to which duties of 
support can exist when one of the same- or opposite-sex cohabitants is also 
married or in another cohabitation relationship, or put differently, the 
question of polygamous cohabitation relationships. Despite the Paixao 
judgment, it is difficult to imagine courts treating existing South African civil 
marriages as lightly if the plaintiff were asserting a right to support from an 
intimate partner with whom she neither lived, nor was married to. The 
reasoning in the Paixão is therefore not likely to assist African women whose 
partners are also married in civil law. I say this because the legal history of 
the privileging of civil marriages over customary marriages, to the extent of 
a civil marriage to another woman at times invalidating an existing 
customary marriage,126 would most likely dissuade courts from similar 
reasoning, especially when the customary relationships in question are not 
marriages but unmarried intimate relationships.  
                                            
125  Paixão SCA paras 9, 10, my own emphasis. 
126  See Bonthuys and Pieterse 2000 THRHR and cases cited. 
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I have argued that the factors which courts take into account to determine 
the existence of contractual duties of support in opposite-sex intimate 
relationships mix public policy considerations with factors which would 
normally be considered to prove the existence of a contract. Even a strict 
application of contractual reasoning would not, however, favour African 
women in unmarried intimate relationships, since they may have limited 
bargaining power due to their financial and social vulnerability. Rather, 
public policy-related factors like the duration of relationships, the birth and 
care of children, and financial dependence would tend to favour women 
claimants.  
On the other hand, many of the status-based factors reflect Western ideals 
of conjugality, which in turn are equated with co-residence in the typical 
Western ideal of marriage and family life. The very terms "domestic 
partnership" (used in the Draft Bill) and "cohabitation relationship" confirm 
this fundamental connection. Courts have not yet extended typically 
marriage-like rights and duties to people whose family relationships radically 
diverge from the Western model. I anticipate that this would be a stumbling 
block for African women.  
5  Conclusion  
I have argued that the recent developments of the duty to support have 
excluded the largest and most vulnerable group of South African women. In 
the next part of the paper I will argue that their exclusion constitutes unfair 
discrimination on the grounds of sex, gender, sexual orientation, race, 
culture and socio-economic status, and I will explore developments of 
customary and common law rules to cure this. However, as Cloete JA 
recognised in Du Plessis v Road Accident Fund:127  
[j]udges should be mindful of the fact that the major engine for law reform 
should be the Legislature and not the Judiciary…the Judiciary should confine 
itself to those incremental changes which are necessary to keep the common 
law in step with the dynamic and evolving fabric of our society. 
The first prize would therefore be properly drafted legislation granting rights 
to support to all South African intimate partners. One potential avenue for 
legal development is a lawsuit to compel government to enact the Draft 
Domestic Partnerships Bill. As I indicated above, however, several aspects 
of this Draft Bill would limit its usefulness for the most disadvantaged South 
African women. In lieu of statutory reform, strategic litigation is needed to 
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develop remedies in customary and common law. The second part of the 
article is about avenues and arguments for developments in the common 
and customary law.  
Bibliography 
Literature 
Albertyn 2007 SAJHR  
Albertyn C "Substantive Equality and Transformation in South Africa" 2007 
SAJHR 253-276 
Amaoteng and Heaton 2015 SARS  
Amaoteng AY and HeatonTB "Changing Race Differences in Family 
Structure and Household Composition in South Africa" 2015 SARS 59-79 
Bennett Customary Law  
Bennett TW Customary Law in South Africa (Juta Cape Town 2004) 
Bonthuys 2007 SAJHR  
Bonthuys E "Race and Gender in the Civil Union Act" 2007 SAJHR 526-542 
Bonthuys and Pieterse 2000 THRHR  
Bonthuys E and Pieterse M "Still Unclear: The Validity of Certain Customary 
Marriages in Terms of the Recognition of Customary Marriages Act" 2000 
THRHR 616-625 
Budlender et al Women, Land and Customary Law  
Budlender D et al Women, Land and Customary Law (Community Agency 
for Social Enquiry Johannesburg 2011) 
Clark and Van Zyl Handbook  
Clark B and Van Zyl L Handbook of the South African Law of Maintenance 
(LexisNexis Durban 2016) 
De Souza 2013 Acta Juridica  
De Souza M "When Non-registration Becomes Non-recognition: Examining 
the Law and Practice of Customary Marriage Registration in South Africa" 
2013 Acta Juridica 239-272 
De Vos 2004 SAJHR  
De Vos P "Same-sex Sexual Desire and the Re-imagining of the South 
African Family" 2004 SAJHR 179-206 
E BONTHUYS PER / PELJ 2018 (21) 27 
De Vos 2007 SAJHR  
De Vos P "The 'Inevitability' of Same Sex Marriage in South Africa's Post-
Apartheid State" 2007 SAJHR 432-465 
Goldblatt 2003 SALJ  
Goldblatt B "Regulating Domestic Partnerships – A Necessary Step in the 
Development of South African Family Law" 2003 SALJ 610-629 
Heaton and Kruger South African Family Law  
Heaton J and Kruger H South African Family Law 4th ed (Juta Cape Town 
2015) 
Himonga "Dissolution of a Customary Marriage"  
Himonga, C "The Dissolution of a Customary Marriage by Divorce" in 
Heaton J (ed) The Law of Divorce and Dissolution of Life Partnerships in 
South Africa (Juta Cape Town 2014) 231-275 
Himonga and Moore Reform of Customary Marriage  
Himonga C and Moore E Reform of Customary Marriage, Divorce and 
Succession in South Africa (Juta Cape Town 2015) 
Himonga and Pope 2013 Acta Juridica  
Himonga C and Pope A "Mayelane v Ngwenyama and Minister of Home 
Affairs: A Reflection on Wider Implications" 2013 Acta Juridica 318-338 
Hosegood 2013 Acta Juridica  
Hosegood V "Women, Marriage and Domestic Arrangements in Rural 
KwaZulu-Natal, South Africa" 2013 Acta Juridica 143-168 
Hosegood, McGrath and Moultrie 2009 Demographic Research  
Hosegood V, McGrath N and Moultrie T "Dispensing with Marriage: Marital 
and Partnership Trends in Rural KwaZulu-Natal, South Africa 2000-2006" 
2009 Demographic Research 279-312 
Kovacs, Ndashe and Williams 2013 Acta Juridica  
Kovacs RJ, Ndashe S and Williams J "Twelve Years Later: How the 
Recognition of Customary Marriages Act of 1998 is Failing Women in South 
Africa" 2013 Acta Juridica 273-291 
Kruuse 2009 SAJHR 
Kruuse H "'Here's to You, Mrs Robinson:' Peculiarities and Paragraph 29 in 
Determining the Treatment of Domestic Partnerships" 2009 SAJHR 380-
391 
E BONTHUYS PER / PELJ 2018 (21) 28 
Lind 2005 Acta Juridica  
Lind C "Domestic Partnerships and Marital Status Discrimination" 2005 Acta 
Juridica 108-130 
Makiwane et al Families in Mpumalanga  
Makiwane M et al A Baseline Study on Families in Mpumalanga (Human 
Sciences Research Council Pretoria 2012) 
Mwambene and Kruuse 2013 Acta Juridica  
Mwambene L and Kruuse H "Form over Function? The Practical Application 
of the Recognition of Customary Marriages Act 1998 in South Africa" 2013 
Acta Juridica 292-317 
Posel 2006 History Workshop Journal  
Posel D "Marriage at the Drop of a Hat: Housing and Partnership in South 
Africa's Urban African Townships, 1920s-1960s" 2006 History Workshop 
Journal 57-76 
Posel and Rudwick 2013 Acta Juridica  
Posel D and Rudwick S "Changing Patterns of Marriage and Cohabitation 
in South Africa" 2013 Acta Juridica 169-180 
Russell 2003 Social Dynamics  
Russell M "Understanding Black Households: The Problem" 2003 Social 
Dynamics 5-47 
Schäfer 2006 SALJ  
Schäfer L "Marriage and Marriage-Like Relationships: Constructing a New 
Hierarchy of Life Partnerships" 2006 SALJ 626-647 
Smith "Dissolution of a Life Partnership" 
Smith B "The Dissolution of a Life or Domestic Partnership" in Heaton J (ed) 
The Law of Divorce and Dissolution of Life Partnerships in South Africa (Juta 
Cape Town 2014) 389-475 
Smith 2010 PELJ  
Smith B "Rethinking Volks v Robinson: The Implications of Applying a 
'Contextualised Choice Model' to Prospective South African Domestic 
Partnerships Legislation" 2010 PELJ 238-300 
E BONTHUYS PER / PELJ 2018 (21) 29 
Smith 2011 SALJ  
Smith B "The Interplay between Registered and Unregistered Domestic 
Partnerships under the Draft Domestic Partnerships Bill, 2008 and the 
Potential Role of the Putative Marriage Doctrine" 2011 SALJ 560-593 
Smith and Heaton 2012 THRHR  
Smith B and Heaton J "Extension of the Dependant's Action to Heterosexual 
Life Partnerships after Volks v Robinson and the Coming into Operation of 
the Civil Union Act –Thus Far and No Further?" 2012 THRHR 472-484 
Stats SA Community Survey 2016  
Statistics South Africa Community Survey 2016 (Statistics South Africa 
Pretoria 2016) 
Stats SA Income Dynamics  
Statistics South Africa Census 2011: Income Dynamics and Poverty Status 
of Households in South Africa (Statistics South Africa Pretoria 2015) 
Stats SA Marriages and Divorces 2015  
Statistics South Africa Marriages and Divorces 2015 (Statistics South Africa 
Pretoria 2017) 
Stats SA Vulnerable Groups  
Statistics South Africa Vulnerable Groups Indicator Report 2016 (Statistics 
South Africa Pretoria 2017) 
Yarbrough 2015 SARS  
Yarbrough MW "South African Marriage in Policy and Practice: A Dynamic 
Story" 2015 SARS 5-23  
Case law 
AM v RM 2010 2 SA 223 (ECP)  
Amod v Multilateral Motor Vehicle Accidents Fund 1999 4 SA 1319 (SCA) 
Benefeld v West 2011 2 SA 379 (GSJ) 
Braude v Braude (1899) 16 SC 565  
Chadwick v Chadwick 1914 CPD 1008  
Claassen v Van der Watt 1969 3 SA 68 (T)  
E BONTHUYS PER / PELJ 2018 (21) 30 
Daniels v Campbell 2004 5 SA 331 (CC) 
Du Plessis v Road Accident Fund 2004 1 SA 359 (SCA) 
EH v SH 2012 4 SA 164 (SCA) 
Fanti v Boto 2008 5 SA 405 (C) 
Finlay v Kutoane 1993 4 SA 675 (W) 
Friedman v Harris 1928 CPD 43  
G v F 1966 3 SA 579 (O)  
Gory v Kolver 2007 4 SA 97 (CC)  
Hassam v Jacobs 2009 5 SA 572 (CC) 
Hoosein v Dangor 2010 2 All SA 55 (WCC) 
Ismail v Ismail 1983 1 SA 1006 (A) 
Karp v Kuhn 1948 4 SA 825 (T)  
Khan v Khan 2005 2 SA 272 (T) 
Langemaat v Minister of Safety and Security 1998 3 SA 312 (T) 
Laubscher v Duplan 2017 2 SA 264 (CC) 
Lloyd v Mitchell 2004 2 All SA 542 (C)  
Mabena v Letsoalo 1998 2 SA 1068 (T)  
Martens v Martens 1952 3 SA 771 (W)  
Maseko v Maseko 1992 3 SA 190 (W) 
Mayeki v Shield Insurance 1975 4 SA 370 (C) 
McDonald v Young 2012 3 SA 1 (SCA) 
Meyer v Road Accident Fund (TPD) (unreported) case number 29950/2004 
of 28 March 2006 
MM v MN 2013 4 SA 415 (CC) 
E BONTHUYS PER / PELJ 2018 (21) 31 
Motsoatsoa v Roro 2011 2 All SA 324 (GSJ)  
Paixao v Road Accident Fund 2011 ZAGPJHC 68 (1 July 2011) 
Paixão v Road Accident Fund 2012 6 SA 377 (SCA) 
Pietzsch v Thompson 1972 4 SA 122 (R) 
Richards v Guardian Assurance 1907 TH 24  
Robinson v Volks 2004 6 SA 288 (C) 
Rose v Rose 2015 2 All SA 352 (WCC) 
Ryland v Edros 1997 2 SA 690 (C) 
SANTAM v Fondo 1960 2 SA 467 (A) 
Satchwell v President of the Republic of South Africa 2002 6 SA 1 (CC) 
Staples v Marquard 1919 CPD 181  
Thembesile v Thembesile 2002 2 SA 209 (T) 
TM v ZJ 2016 1 SA 71 (KZD) 
Verheem v Road Accident Fund 2010 2 SA 409 (GP) 
Volks v Robinson 2005 5 BCLR 446 (CC) 
Wormald v Kambule 2006 3 SA 562 (SCA) 
Legislation  
Black Laws Amendment Act 76 of 1963 
Civil Union Act 17 of 2006 
Constitution of the Republic of South Africa 200 of 1993 
Divorce Act 70 of 1979  
Intestate Succession Act 81 of 1987 
Maintenance of Surviving Spouses Act 27 of 1990 
Marriage Act 25 of 1961 
E BONTHUYS PER / PELJ 2018 (21) 32 
Recognition of Customary Marriages Act 120 of 1998 
Government publications 
Draft Domestic Partnerships Bill (Gen N 36 in GG 30663 14 January 2008) 
List of Abbreviations 
PELJ Potchefstroom Electronic Law Journal 
SAJHR South African Journal on Human Rights 
SALJ South African Law Journal 
SARS South African Review of Sociology 
Stats SA Statistics South Africa 
THRHR Tydskrif vir die Hedendaagse Romeins-
Hollandse Reg 
 
 
